From Religion to Language*
The Time of National Society and the Notion of the “Shared” in Sociological Theory

Mitsuhiro TADA

1 Introduction

The famous phenomenological sociologist Thomas Luckmann published a small English book titled *The Sociology of Language* in 1975, which was a completely revised version of his article for the *Handbuch der Empirischen Sozialforschung*. Even though this handbook, edited by René König, was published in 1969, Luckmann had already written the first "draft" of his article in the first half of the 1960s. He reflected on those days, saying, “[a]t that time the sociology of language did not yet exist” (Luckmann 1975: 5). In his view, the sociology of language was a “new field” (Luckmann 1975: 5). From the mid-1960s onward, human and social sciences rapidly became interested in language, and in this respect, sociology was no exception. Influenced by the neighboring disciplines, it also made a *linguistic turn*. Luckmann continues that “[s]ignificant changes in linguistic theory and a great expansion of empirical work in the psychology of language and anthropological linguistics were already apparent in the middle sixties as was the interest taken in language by increasing numbers of sociologists” (Luckmann 1975: 5).

However, was the sociology of language really a "new field"? In fact, half of this statement is true, and half is false, because the sociology of language had previously existed. For instance, Émile Durkheim was highly concerned with language. Although he could not intensively develop his sociology of language, his view of language as a social institution—a so-called “social reality *sui generis*”—influenced Ferdinand de Saussure. As we shall see below, Luckmann likewise referred to Durkheim with frequency (see also Luckmann 1962: 516; Luckmann 1975: 12–13).

The thing to reconsider might therefore be that sociology had stopped giving attention to language until the mid-1960s, despite the work of a pioneer such as Durkheim. Why did language not matter to sociology? This paper does not respond to this question as such, but instead it endeavors to see how language was treated in the sociological theory of the time. It will contribute to examining the sensitive relationship between language and sociology. Accordingly, I shall first confirm in
short the formation process of the “sociology of language” as a field in the 1960s. Based on a liberal intention, the sociology of language emerged as an attempt to focus not on homogeneity but rather on heterogeneity in language. Second, I will examine the view of language in the so-called “meaning school,” especially in Thomas Luckmann’s phenomenological sociology of knowledge. At the time of the privatization of religion, he thought that the public basis of knowledge was not religion, but language. This was probably connected with an intention to resolve the problem of meaning in interpretative sociology; subjective meaning presupposes linguistic meaning that is shared intersubjectively. Language was considered not as a problem, but as a means to solve a problem. In this respect, Luckmann’s sociology should be called “linguistic sociology” rather than the sociology of language. Finally, I shall highlight the historical context of the postwar period in which the framework of a “national society” was consolidated. Although Luckmann had almost never directed his attention to the shadow of the nation-state hidden in common language, social conditions associated with the nation-state were indispensable to the expansion of standardized language. In particular, the stabilized international order, rapid industrialization, and increased standards of education contributed to the sharing of language among people. These formed the background for the basis of sociological theory to shift from religion to language.

It must be noted that the following consideration is to a certain extent hypothetical. Regarding the relationship between language and sociology, further inquiry is required both theoretically and historically, while the discourses of other sociologists on language must also be addressed. Nevertheless, one may say that the idea of language as a “social a priori” will not match the sociological theory in this global society. A “linguistic community [Sprachgemeinschaft]” is not substantial. It is an “imagined community” established through individual subjectivity.

The genuine aim of this consideration is, thus, to rethink the theoretical premise that “people share something.” This paper is a preliminary approach to this goal. However, if attempting to gain an appropriate grasp of today’s global society, sociological theory will have to depart from the reality that people share the sharing of nothing. We are living in a period in which we cannot presuppose that something is shared.

2 The Rise of the Sociology of Language

This chapter first briefly reflects on the postwar formation process of the sociology of language.
As stated above, language received a great deal of attention in sociology from the 1960s onward. This transformation can be observed in the programs of the World Congress of the International Sociological Association (ISA). Joshua A. Fishman, one of the driving forces behind establishment of the sociology of language, said that the Seventh World Congress of the ISA held in September 1970 in Varna, a Bulgarian city on the Black Sea, was a "good index for the progress...that the sociology of language had made within the past couple of years" (Fishman 1971: 33). He reported that four years before when the Sixth World Congress was held in Evian (France) in 1966, the sociology of language was assigned neither a definite place nor a specific section. However, following the Congress, over 20 participants with concerns about language held a one-day informal meeting and decided to submit an application to the ISA to establish the Research Committee on Sociolinguistics. The Committee finally became reality in 1968. Thus, at the Seventh World Congress in 1970, two sections on the sociology of language were held almost daily during the sessional period, with a total of 24 presentations.

The sociology of language entered the limelight in this way in the late 1960s and 1970s, although it was not a totally new field. According to Fishman, the sociology of language was a "partly new, partly reborn field" (Fishman 1971: 34). However, this statement did not point to the existence of antecessors like Durkheim, but rather referred to a historical shadow. He states:

[T]he sociology of language was a special German preference during the first three decades of this [20th] century. It was, however, influenced and controlled very rapidly and very intensively, first through the ideology of Pan-Germanism, and then through the ideology and myth of the Nazis. It is therefore no wonder that this discipline, in the entire quarter century after the end of the war, had still not gained scientific acknowledgement in German-speaking spheres, even though acknowledgment had long since been accorded to this discipline in the USA, UK, France, the Soviet Union, and different parts of the Third World. (Fishman 1971: 34-35)

Unfortunately, we cannot afford to trace this historical background, which probably dates back to Herder and Fichte. However, when the sociology of language was revived in the late 1960s and 1970s, its right-leaning past and links with nationalism were not yet very distant. Hence, its rebirth was perceived as a sort of "new beginning" (Fishman 1971: 35). Furthermore, this was supposedly the reason why the revived sociology of language had repeatedly emphasized the approach focused on
linguistic heterogeneity in society. It was ideologically leftish or "liberal". Fishman thus says:

[The sociology of language is] also useful for the poor and powerless, for the weak and disadvantaged, for the modest and those who are forced into uncertainty from whatever country; because only the concerns of such people can prevent the social sciences from belonging once again to the cliqueurs and from contributing to the ruins that the totalitarianism of each coloring has always provoked. (Fishman 1971: 35)

The orientation to difference was a self-consciousness in this new sociology of language. Some sociologists of language thereby insisted on the contrast to the existing sociology; the sociology of language refutes sociology's traditional presupposition that language is collectively homogeneous. For instance, Rolf Kjolseth states:

Sociology departed from "common sense" definitions of language, and conceived of language as a generally homogeneous phenomenon inside social groups and categories, while the sociology of language [Sprachsoziologie] regards it as an important mechanism through which differences inside and among groups are articulated. (Kjolseth 1971: 15)

The sociology of language considered natural linguistic behaviors to be principally heterogeneous and variable (cf. Kjolseth 1971: 15–16). This was the view that emerged around 1970 as the sociology of language.

Consequently, the sociology of language was non-normativistic. It can be seen particularly in the conception of multilinguality. Traditional sociology, linguistics, and psychology, from which the sociology of language derives, had conceived a multilingual person to be "unnatural" and unstable (Kjolseth 1971: 18). For instance, sociology considered such a multilingual individual exclusively as marginal among groups, and tried to detect its unique character and explore the symptom of "assimilation" to either group (cf. Kjolseth 1971: 18). Likewise, descriptive linguistics presumed language to be the mostly pure and invariant. Hence, it tried to explain how "unnatural" contact among languages impaired the ideal inner structure of language (Kjolseth 1971: 17). Psychology also inquired about the "cost" paid by a bilingual or multilingual person (cf. Kjolseth 1971: 17). In any case, the underlying premise was that a human being is normally monolingual.
However, if examining the real world, the presumed monolingual individual is only an ideal type. According to Suzanne Romaine, some 5,000 languages exist in the world, and yet the number of U.N. member states is around 190. She hence estimates that about half the world's population is bilingual and that bilingualism is present in nearly every country (Romaine 2000: 33). In addition, many linguistic variations (e.g., dialects, sociolects) are found even within the "same" or "common" language. Hence, all people of the world virtually have a multilingual character (cf. Kjolseth 1971: 18).

But, this realistic appreciation is not alone in distinguishing the sociology of language from the existing fields of sociology, psychology, and descriptive linguistics. One of the main questions in the sociology of language lies in the rule of adequacy related to social context: the rule that leads to the individual choice of a language in different situations (cf. Kjolseth 1971: 18). Existing sociology, psychology, and linguistics postulated a normative system that is excessively unitary and simplified, and they gave significance to data according to the degree of coincidence and deviation. In contrast, the sociology of language asserted that such a norm is not a given but rather an object for empirical and inductive research (cf. Kjolseth 1971: 18–19).

As stated above, the sociology of language was oriented toward heterogeneity and not homogeneity, and turned linguistic differences into a study in relation to social problems. Through the prism of language, it observes discrepancies in society such as discrimination and disparity.

However, it is hard to say whether the sociology of language currently secures a firm position in the whole of sociology; it appears to have been incorporated into linguistics as sociolinguistics. As a result, the sociology of language is forced to focus not on society but on language. Conversely, in the 1960s, sociological theory had begun to take note of language as intersubjectively shared among individuals. This view of language was particularly evident in the work of the so-called "meaning school," which represents itself as the legitimate successor of Max Weber's interpretative sociology (verstehende Soziologie). In this school, language was conceived not as a problem but as a means or method to solve a problem. It was expected to resolve the problem of understanding subjective meaning, while social problems related to language ceased to be directly relevant.

3 Linguistic Turn in Sociological Theory

Paying attention to differences was, in effect, not limited to the sociology of language. It steadily filtered into the whole field of sociology of the time as well. This
can be observed in some of the leading theories of sociology from the 1960s onward, especially in the work of the “meaning school,” such as phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology. This school presented itself as belonging to the genealogy of subjectivism of Max Weber’s interpretative sociology, and is known for its criticism of Talcott Parsons’s normativism and objectivism. That is, individual actors are not “judgmental dopes”; they autonomously recognize the world. From this point of view, the task for sociology is to reveal the subjective meaning that each actor attributes to reality.

However, the meaning school did not totally demolish the Parsonian premise that people share something. While denying that a homogeneous and invariant norm is shared, the school maintained the very assumption that something is shared.

This can be seen in the relationship between religion and language. As is well known, Parsons gave weight to the normative value of religion in his theory. He considered that the existence of meta-reality (telic system), which is in a relation of cybernetic superordination to the action system, must be assumed with respect to religion (Parsons 1978b: 356–357). To put it briefly, he believed that society is a “religiously based moral order” (Fenn 1970: 117). Originally, the two greats of sociology, Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, treated religion as the most important research object, although their methodologies differed from one another. Parsons inherited their sociology of religion, and eventually, at least for normative integration, he relied on Durkheim more heavily (Parsons 1979: 159). When reflecting on this history of sociology, the assumption that religion underlies people’s collective identity can be said to have been fundamental to sociology.

However, this assumption gradually became untenable in the postwar context. Religion as the foundation of people’s collective identity was destined to be transformed with industrialization. This does not mean that all religious communities had vanished. Parsons also admitted that the religious value system had been secularized and institutionalized in modern society. But, through the course of postwar industrialization, the social situation of “value-monotheism” was disappearing. As shown below, religion had become left to the individual’s own choice. Hence, the assumption that one religious value still remained the common norm on the macro-social level had become unrealistic. A normative value of religion was no longer social a priori. With the privatization of religion and the progress of value-polytheism in society, something else had been gaining prominent attention as an alternative macro-level common basis. That was language.

In the industrialized “national society,” people can believe in different religions (or they can even have no religion). Religions are generally separate from the state (politics)
and under the protection of tolerance and liberty. However, in return, they must be
competitive with other ones to gain believers. In other words, religious traditions
are marketed, and the state assumes the role as the impartial guardian of order

The circumstances surrounding language are contrasting. In a national society,
language is overtly under state control through school education. As a result, the
rationalized and secularized modern state has a tendency to become not so much a
religious community as a linguistic community. It is true that a nation-state does not
set the border through language alone. Multilingual nation-states are not rare, while
languages that extend beyond national boundaries are numerous. But, granting that
people can refuse a religious belief, they cannot organize social life without language.
Nobody can escape the ground of language.

In the field of sociological theory since the 1960s, the meaning school had given
particular emphasis to language. Thomas Luckmann, who played a central role
in the rise of phenomenological sociology, would be one of its leading exponents.
He regarded the "sociology of language" as one of the pillars in his sociology of
knowledge (Wissenssoziologie), and so developed his phenomenological inquiry.
However, his view on language did not differ much from Parsons's presupposition
of religion as a common value. While Parsons assumed "congruence" between
and within the culture, personality, and social structure in a society, Luckmann
emphasized incongruence in today's functionally differentiated society. Nevertheless,
regarding language, Luckmann assumed congruence.

As just stated, the sociology of language was the one pillar of Luckmann's
sociology of knowledge, while the sociology of religion was the other. In The Social
Construction of Reality written with Peter Berger, Luckmann clearly states that the
sociology of knowledge presupposes a sociology of language, and that a sociology
of knowledge without a sociology of religion is impossible (Berger and Luckmann
better known than the sociology of language. The point worth making here is that,
as Richard K. Fenn (1970: 130) suggests, Luckmann's view in sociology of religion
was partially similar to that of Parsons. Luckmann did not deny the significance of
religion in contemporary society, noting that:

An objective world-view is, of course, a constitutive element of any society, just
as an individual system of relevance is a constitutive element of personal identity.
The statement that religion is present in nonspecific form in all societies and all
"normal" (socialized) individuals is, therefore, axiomatic. (Luckmann 1967: 78)
It should therefore never be considered that society becomes irreligious with the development of modernization. According to Luckmann, individuation, by which a human being transcends biological nature to become a Self who autonomously creates meaning, occurs in social processes with others, and this process is "fundamentally religious" in that it constructs the interpretative schema and meaning system of the individual and develops a morally relevant biography (cf. Luckmann 1967: 48–49). In short, "the problem of individual existence in society is a 'religious' problem" (Luckmann 1967: 12).

However, contrary to Parsons, Luckmann discovered incongruence within religion (Fenn 1970: 128–129). Modern society no longer secures its inner order as ethical based on religion. The social, cultural, and personality systems differentiate themselves from each other, so that the autonomy of the individual grows. The internalization of value is also directly achieved by autonomous individuals without an institution.

The notion of complete congruence between the "official" model of religion and the subjective system of "ultimate" significance implicitly rests on the assumption of "perfect" socialization of an individual into the social order. This assumption is, of course, untenable. Nonetheless it might be possible to disregard this difficulty in the case of relatively simple societies in which individuals typically internalize "most" of a relatively homogeneous culture. It would be entirely unrealistic to disregard this difficulty in the case of more complex societies. It is precisely in such societies, however, that religion is likely to become institutionally specialized. (Luckmann 1967: 79)

In the complex society of the modern age, there is incongruence between the value of religion and the meaning system of an individual. For Luckmann, religion should be dealt with not in terms of an institutional subsystem with an integrative function, as Parsons presumed, but, on the contrary, in connection with the increase in the individual's autonomy. In the functional differentiation, religion cannot avoid institutional specialization. This transforms the ultimate system of meaning into a subjective reality that each individual selects (cf. Luckmann 1967: 86). In short, religion had become a "private affair" (Luckmann 1967: 86).

The social form of religion emerging in modern industrial societies is characterized by the direct accessibility of an assortment of religious representations to potential consumers. The sacred cosmos is mediated neither
through a specialized domain of religious institutions nor through other primary public institutions. It is the direct accessibility of the sacred cosmos, more precisely, of an assortment of religious themes, which makes religion today essentially a phenomenon of the "private sphere." (Luckmann 1967: 103)

Regarding the relationship between modern society and the individual, Luckmann supported Max Weber's insight of value-polytheism, as opposed to Parsons's value-monotheism.

Nevertheless, Luckmann was also subject to the strong influence of Durkheim as Parsons was. This is directly expressed in Luckmann's criticism of American sociology as overlooking Durkheim's insight of homo duplex (double man) (and G. H. Mead's theory of the "social origin of Self"). According to Luckmann, the individual is not the given principle to explain the formation of society. Instead, as Durkheim and Mead pointed out using the terms "fact" or "process," society is a given. The condition for the emergence of the Self is found in society; the individual is impossible without society. Luckmann insisted that to understand the relationship between society, religion, and person, there is a need to clarify such a reversal of the individual and society (cf. Luckmann 1967: 19-20).

Luckmann did not believe in the naked and self-sufficient Self. Originally, in Durkheim's thinking, individualism itself was a collective consciousness in modernity; the "cult of the individual" that places the highest value on the individual is the religion in secularized society. Therefore, individuation does not always mean atomization through which people become completely isolated without any common basis. Individuals still share the value of individualism. Appropriately, Talcott Parsons expressed this as "institutionalized individualism" (Parsons 1978a: 228). A similar indication can be also found in Luckmann, for whom "[t]he dominant themes in the modern sacred cosmos bestow something like a sacred status upon the individual by articulating his 'autonomy.'...[U]ltimate' significance is found by the typical individual in modern industrial societies primarily in the 'private sphere'—and thus in his 'private' biography" (Luckmann 1967: 109). For a typical individual in modern society, the traditional symbolic universes are irrelevant to everyday life and have lost their character of superordinate reality (cf. Luckmann 1967: 109). Instead, the existence of individual itself becomes the "ultimate" meaning common to people.

The transcendent social order ceases to be subjectively significant both as a representation of an encompassing cosmic meaning and in its concrete institutional manifestations. With respect to matters that "count," the individual
is retrenched in the "private sphere." It is of considerable interest that even those subordinate themes in the modern sacred cosmos that are derived from economic and political ideologies tend to be articulated in an increasingly "individualistic" manner—for example, the responsible citizen, the successful business "operator." (Luckmann 1967: 109-110)

In Luckmann's opinion, human organisms do not construct universes of meaning from scratch, but they are rather born into meaningful universes. By internalizing a historically given universe of meaning, they can transcend their biological nature (Luckmann 1967: 51). This process is called socialization; a human being becomes a Self through the internalization of the meaning configuration in each society and period. As stated above, Luckmann considered the socialization transcending from biological nature to Self to be "fundamentally religious," because the emergence of self-consciousness or, most of all, conscience in relation to the other Selves is the universal condition of religion (Luckmann 1967: 51).

Such an internalized configuration of meaning specific to each society and period is termed worldview (or "world view"; Luckmann 1967: 51). Language became significant in this respect. Luckmann posited it as the mediating basis of the worldview. He states:

The world view is objectivated in society in various forms. Some socially approved and significant ways of orientation in nature and society manifest themselves in stylized form of movement, gesture and expression that are transmitted from generation to generation. Some socially significant moral ideas and values are represented by symbols of various kinds; for example, flags, icons, totems. The most important form in which a world view is socially objectivated, however, is language. (Luckmann 1967: 53-54, emphasis added)

There is a reason for language to have become the focus in this context. If observing various worldviews in society, sociology must shift the observational level from objectivism to subjectivism: i.e., observing observers. The objective perception of the world no longer matters. Instead, sociology observes how observers in society observe their own specific environment. It must observe observers' subjective realities because the "struggle of the gods" among worldviews is a social fact proper to modernity.

With the shift in the observational level, the basis of sociological theory moved from religion to language. For observing worldviews, language was a convenient tool that satisfies both subjectivism and "sociologyness," because it was not the
normative value that controls human actions, but the cognitive rule whose social sharing conditions the individual's knowledge. Even though subjective views on the world vary in a thousand ways, they are neither arbitrary nor incomprehensible; the communality of language controls knowledge about the world. In this sense, the social construction of reality means the linguistic construction of reality. Luckmann continues:

A language contains the most comprehensive and, at the same time, most highly differentiated system of interpretation. This system can be internalized, in principle, by any member of society, and all experiences of all members can be potentially located in that system. The logic and the taxonomy contained in the world view are stabilized in the syntax and the semantic structure of the language. (Luckmann 1967: 54, emphasis added)

Thus, language replaced individualized (or privatized) religion. In regard to the formation of worldviews, language was considered to be more fundamental than religion. Without being mediated by language, the worldview cannot routinize nor stabilize the individual's memory, thinking, conduct, or perception (cf. Luckmann 1967: 55). According to Luckmann, the acquisition of the mother tongue means the inheritance of the "natural" logic and taxonomy of a worldview (cf. Luckmann 1967: 55). "Through language the world view serves the individual as a source of meaning that is continuously available—both internally and socially" (Luckmann 1967: 55).

A worldview (a particular cognitive style) is not an individual's product, but a heritage of the historical and cultural life-world where s/he was born. And its system of meaning becomes internalized through language. More precisely, language is in itself the reflection of the worldview of the society. The relation of language to religion is also the same in this respect. Although the reality of a sacred cosmos surely differs from that of daily life, the sociology of religion must be reconsidered in terms of language. Luckmann states that "[e]ven if the relationship between sociology of religion and sociology of language seems less direct, so only because the sociology of religion in general naively receives the linguistic basis of the social molding of religious symbol world" (Luckmann 1969: 1051). Language has the potentiality to symbolize and objectivate sanctities into sacred calendars, sacred topographies, ritual enactments, ritual acts, dance, epos, or drama (cf. Luckmann 1967: 60). "[L]anguage combines with ritual acts and icons in the articulation of a sacred cosmos" (Luckmann 1967: 60). Thus, language can be regarded as an institution that constructs a common reality for people. Following Wilhelm von Humboldt, Luckmann says that the
learning of a particular language needs to "internalize" its inner form of language [innere Form der Sprache], that is, its explicit rules and contextual elements (cf. Luckmann 1967: 55). On that basis, he cites von Humboldt as follows (Luckmann 1967: 55 n. 23, 121–122): "At the same time that language has a character that is indeed internal, it also exists as an independent and external fact which exerts constraint on man" (von Humboldt [1830–1835] 2010: 392).

According to Luckmann, von Humboldt's view on language enumerated the criteria by which Emile Durkheim defined "social fact" in The Rules of the Sociological Method (Luckmann 1967: 55 n. 23, 121–122). If this interpretation is correct, the distinction between the normative and cognitive will become ambiguous. At least, it is possible to consider that language as a reality sui generis "orients" people's knowledge through internalization. In fact, Luckmann says, "[e]ach language embodies a specific world-apprehension [Weltauffassung]: the inner form of language coincides with the fundamental orientation-and evaluation models of world-apprehension" (Luckmann 1993: 373, emphasis added). If so, bringing on the normative value of religion is no longer necessary. Nor does it correspond to the current era. Rather, the social reality prior to the individual is life-worldly language (or the vernacular). Such a notion suited to phenomenological sociology's assumption to conceive intersubjectivity not as a problem but as a given starting point; the "subjective meaning" is the linguistic meaning shared intersubjectively, and therefore, the understanding of subjectivity is possible. "Although they [languages] are rooted in social interaction and are changed in it, they define, as meaning systems, the frame of meaning of subjective experiences, and they also widely determine the intersubjective reconstruction of meaning and action" (Luckmann 2002: 209).

Insofar as presupposing a shared language among individuals, it was inevitable to draw closer to the Durkheimian idea of language as a reality sui generis. Language was viewed as the new common basis to replace religion. Luckmann opened the lexical item "sociology of language" in the State Lexicon (Staatslexikon) with the following words:

[L]anguage is based on the sociality of human being. At the same time, the human kind of community formation [Gemeinschaftsbildung] without language is inconceivable. A person's life and action in society are not simply determined through external compulsion. They are subjectively meaningful through the personal acquisition of culture that transcends individuals. Culture is a meaning construct that gives form to a person's consciousness. (Luckmann 1962: 514)
Community formation is impossible without language, and individual consciousness is impossible without the community's culture. That is, language subsumes individuals into a community. For the social construction of reality, language is the main medium that enables the intersubjectivity of knowledge. To use a language means to belong to its community. "The reality-building function of language joins the individual speaker to a historical community, or even sets of historical communities as may be the case with bilinguals" (Luckmann and Knoblauch 1993: 720).

In this way, language was expected to play the role of mediating "private spheres" that were becoming increasingly closed. Indeed, the renaissance of the sociology of language in the 1960s coincided with a period of cultural revolution and privatization through radical industrialization and economic prosperity (cf. Hobsbawm [1994] 1996: chap. 10 and 11). The belief that people shared a traditional (religious) value was falling out of step with the times. Instead, language was idealized as public property, because the sharing of language and its range seemed evident. "Language is a relatively well circumscribed and relatively autonomous system. No fundamental definitional problems as e.g. for 'religion' have to be resolved" (Luckmann 1973: 54; see also Luckmann 1971: 38).

Luckmann notes that language differs from other social institutions by its relative autonomy (the relatively autonomous semiological structure) and that, with such a linguistic view, Durkheim and his followers (Ferdinand de Saussure and Antoine Meillet) decisively changed the study of language. According to Luckmann, the (re)birth of a new discipline known as the sociology of language in the 1960s was, even if not everything can be ascribed to Durkheim and his school, their "aftermath" (Luckmann 1984: 10). Despite admitting that the link of the new sociology of language with Durkheimian tradition was limited, Luckmann continues as follows:

The view of language as a system of communication with social functions, constructed, maintained and modified in social interaction as an intrinsic part of the social stock of knowledge (of the representations collectives), which is at the heart of the paradigm of the contemporary sociology of language, none the less still exhibits significant traces of the original Durkheimian imprint. (Luckmann 1984: 10)

Luckmann's relation to Durkheim seems not so far from Parsons's normativism with regard to the macro-sociological solution of the meaning problem. To make this clearer, Durkheim's view on language should be investigated, although here we cannot undertake tracing of it. Instead, in what follows, I will consider the historical
background of the "communalization" of language as inversely proportional to the privatization of religion.

4 Language in the Time of the National Society

Theoretically, we can cast doubt on the presupposition that people share a language; languages that individual actors employ can be their own idiolect. Despite a clear awareness of the privatization of religion, Luckmann almost never considered the possibility of the privatization of language. Of course, as a phenomenological sociologist, he did not think that subjective consciousness is fully reducible to language. He even bracketed the self-evidence of the existence of linguistic signs, and analyzed the generation process of language (Luckmann [1973] 1983b: 71–87). However, he assumed that a concrete individual's consciousness is, to a certain extent, determined by a "concrete and historical language." In this sense, his sociology of language should be rather called "linguistic sociology." Language was conceived not as a problem but as a means to solving a problem, notably the problem of understanding subjective meaning; language is the intersubjective stock for understanding.

Nevertheless, "language" here means natural language in daily life, not artificial language in science; the everyday life-world originally underlies the Galilean "rationalized" science that had excluded the issue of life's meaning of human being. "[C]ommunication in science rests on communication in everyday life" (Luckmann [1973] 1983a: 17). This idea, originally ascribed to Edmund Husserl, would also be connected with the historical background of the 1960s in which a suspicion about science and technology was on the rise. This in turn led to the admiration for life-worldly language. However, from a rational perspective, the situation of sharing language in ordinary communication is not always natural. It will rather be more natural to suppose that language, without artificial standardization, grows in degrees of differentiation. In some ways, this is why a universal language or universal symbol
system is required in science.

There is room for discussion on whether an everyday language and its sharing among people are the nature of the life-world. As already suggested, the more widely the language is shared, the more likely it is not to be a *natural*, but a *national* language institutionalized by the state. In this sense, the sharing of language is a very modern phenomenon. Eric J. Hobsbawm points out that spoken national languages could not exist prior to the introduction of general primary education by modern states (Hobsbawm 1992: 52). National languages are almost always semi-artificial constructs, and because of its artificiality, a common language acquired a fixity that made it appear more permanent than it really was (Hobsbawm 1992: 52, 54, 61; Anderson 1991: 44–45). Therefore, “languages, or even linguistic families, are not part of popular reality” (Hobsbawm 1992: 58). Languages indeed multiply with states (Hobsbawm 1992: 63; see also Deutsch 1969: 21).

This situation is not only valid for a country like Germany, whose nation-building took place through the promotion of language as the “spirit of the people” (*Volksgeist*). The French Revolution unusually insisted on linguistic uniformity as one of conditions for full French citizenship and nationality (Hobsbawm 1992: 21). Surprisingly, 50% of “Frenchmen” at the time of the revolution did not speak the “French language.” Those who spoke it “correctly” constituted only 12–13 percent of the population (Hobsbawm 1992: 60; see also Calvet [1974] 2002: chap. 7). It follows that something like communicative action as conceived by Jürgen Habermas would not have been possible at the populace level before the generally oppressive standardization of language. In fact, Habermas’s image of democracy and the constitutional state corresponds, as typically shown in his “constitutional patriotism,” to the assimilationist idea of the Republic after the French Revolution. In this sense, his theory is nationalist as well (Nishikawa 2006: 183–186).

After all, sociological theories seem to have called on language to maintain the symbolic and practical bonds among people at a time when the public sphere was increasingly falling apart. However, those theories have usually ignored the modern background that has produced linguistic homogeneity. As people were receding into their own private spheres and the diversification of worldview was socially structured, language was idealized as the last tie that would enable mutual connections among privatized individuals: language as the “social *a priori* [*ein gesellschaftliches Apriori*]” (Luckmann 1983b: 1573) that is given to individuals in advance as a part of their life-world. Its artificiality being forgotten, language was “naturalized.”

It should come as no surprise then that this perspective emerged in the 1960s. At the time, the Cold War had unexpectedly brought about the stability of the nation-
state. "The peculiarity of the Cold War was that, speaking objectively, no imminent danger of world war existed" (Hobsbawm [1994] 1996: 226). The Cold War was the "Cold Peace," as it were (Hobsbawm [1994] 1996: 228). There was no open clash, at least between the two superpowers. They accepted the global distribution of force at the end of the Second World War. The new post-colonial states of the "Third World" were also mostly stable. They became anti-communist in their domestic politics and "non-aligned" in international affairs (Hobsbawm [1994] 1996: 227). In consequence, the situation of sharing language was taken for granted.

In addition, the sharing of language had become more and more indispensable to industrialized society. The most dramatic and worldwide change in the second half of the 20th century was the "death of the peasantry" (Hobsbawm [1994] 1996: 289). The population flowed from agricultural areas to cities, and the further division of labor in industrialized societies necessitated the standardization of literacy, because in such societies, as Ernst Gellner ([1983] 2008: 32) says, work centers on communication with others (or on the control of machines, which must be understood by explication). "Work...is no longer the manipulation of things, but of meanings" (Gellner [1983] 2008: 32, emphasis added). In this way, society began to depend on mobility and communication among individuals, and such mobility and communication could only be achieved by a fairly monolithic educational system (Gellner [1983] 2008: 134).

Karl Deutsch points out that "[s]ince 1955 the majority of mankind has for the first time been literate" (Deutsch 1969: 178). The extended years of education along with the prevalence of secondary and higher education thus became common phenomena in national societies that were politically stable and economically growing in the postwar context. This "Educational Revolution," which was first completed in the United States by about the mid-20th century, was the necessary process of structural change in modernity, on a par with the "Industrial Revolution" and "Democratic Revolution" (Parsons and Platt 1975: 1-29; cf. Chernilo 2007: 90). As Louis Althusser argued, the dominant "ideological state apparatus" in the mature capitalist formation became the school: "In fact, the Church has been replaced by the School today" (Althusser [1995] 2011: 180). Producing cultural homogeneities through education, the postwar world had drastically consolidated the framework of the national society. Gellner states:

In general, such [a reasonably large and well-centralized] state presides over, maintains, and is identified with, one kind of culture, one style of communication, which prevails within its borders and is dependent for its perpetuation on a centralized educational system supervised by and often actually run by the state
in question, which *monopolized legitimate culture almost as much as it does legitimate violence, or perhaps more so.* (Gellner [1983] 2008: 134, emphasis added)

Linguistic sociology’s premise of sharing language seems possible only in the “national society.” If this is the case, the question of whether the language standardized by the state can be accepted as the property of life-world is disputable. The concept of language in sociological theory unconsciously bears the mark of the nation-state. In this sense, to borrow Ulrich Beck’s phrase, it must be regarded as a “zombie category” (Beck [2002] 2009: 8). In truth, genuine life-worldly languages might no longer exist anywhere. The following indication of Gellner is impressive:

The establishment of pervasive high cultures (standardized, literacy- and education-based systems of communication), a process rapidly gathering pace throughout the world, has made it seem, to anyone too deeply immersed in our contemporary assumptions, that nationality may be definable in terms of shared culture. Nowadays people can live only in units defined by a shared culture, and internally mobile and fluid. *Genuine cultural pluralism ceases to be viable under current conditions.* (Gellner [1983] 2008: 53–54, emphasis added)

Linguistic sociology had relied on this sort of stable situation regarding the nation-state or national society. According to Gellner again, “Durkheim taught that in religious worship society adores its camouflaged image. In a nationalist age, societies worship themselves brazenly and openly, spurning the camouflage” (Gellner [1983] 2008: 55). That is to say, “[n]ationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants, of the *Volk*, the *narod*” (Gellner [1983] 2008: 56). The possibility that the all-encompassing celebration of life-worldly language includes such “openly avowed collective self-worship” (Gellner [1983] 2008: 55) would not be deniable.

If so, what about the minority linguistic community? Can it not be said to be a life-world? The language of sociology originating in the 1960s looked toward the culturally or socially conditioned differences of language. In fact, there were various protest movements based on ethnicity. However, these were not always going to retrieve the “genuine cultural pluralism” in the world. Many of ethnic movements—some had existed before the First World War, but had experienced an upsurge of support in the 1960s—demanded cultural, social, and economic autonomy, while accepting the political and military framework of the state. Such movements at the time merely criticized centralism; separatism was exceptional (cf. Smith 1991: 138, 141).
Moreover, ethnic communities (or at least, the vindication of them) might in themselves be the social products of the time. Immanuel Wallerstein suggests that the modern world-system of the capitalist economy has not only destroyed communities that historically existed, but also created new communities, including nations (Wallerstein [1986] 1991: 75). He states:

I am tempted to say we are really going not from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft but from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft, but that is not quite right either. Rather it is that our only Gesellschaft, the capitalist world-economy (and even it is only a partially-contractualized structure) has been creating our multiple, meaningful Gemeinschaften. Far from Gemeinschaften dying out, they have never been stronger, more complex, more overlapping and competing, more determinative of our lives. And yet never have they been less legitimate. Nor have they ever been more irrational, substantively irrational, and this is precisely because they have emerged out of a gesellschaftliche process. Our Gemeinschaften are, if you will, our loves that dare not speak their names. (Wallerstein [1986] 1991: 75)

The massive change of the modern world has reactively produced new communities that range from the right to the left. The prevalence of the idea of linguistic community also seems to belong to this trend. Symbolically, when current globalization trends began to emerge in the 1960s along with multinational companies and financial crises, the new term "multiculturalism" also appeared, being accompanied by anti-globalization movements such as the protests against the Vietnam War and worldwide student activism (cf. Nishikawa 2006: 148–154, 164, 222). However, the idea of multiculturalism should not be naively admired. In countries like Canada and Australia where ethnic diversity is relatively low compared with other areas of the world, multicultural discourse was rather a national integration policy that disguises the colonial past and issues surrounding the original inhabitants (Sekine 1994: 198–202; Nishikawa 2006: 148–152, 166–167). In this regard, the introduction of multiculturalism was an early reaction to globalization by the nation-state (cf. Nishikawa 2006: 154). As historical and economic gaps between the majority and the minority widened, states needed a new principle to maintain their national integration.

Seemingly paradoxical, the sociology of language in the 1960s might also contain some criticism over the incomplete national integration, although it was ideologically leftish. The similar paradox can be also seen in the "mini-nationalisms" among minority groups. While they initially had a liberalistic orientation in defense of
universal human rights, they often converted to anti-liberalism or right-wing politics (cf. Berger et al. [1973] 1974: 176–178). Such transformations of (mini-)nationalism were prominent not in the Third World but in the West. In the Third World, nationalism was considered to be a modernizing force to liberate individuals and groups from the long-standing control of the clan, tribe, and the like (and, with this, counter-modernization movements occurred as well). However, in modernized Western countries, (mini-)nationalism could have an affinity with de-modernizing movements that protested against abstract universalism, individualism, and dehumanizing anonymous and vast structures (Berger et al. [1973] 1974: 176–178).

In any case, the linguistic turn in sociological theory was not simply a turn from the Cartesian knowing subject. As shown above, from a perspective of the social history after the war, it can be characterized as the turn from religion. However, the premise of something shared among people was retained there. To restate it more directly, language still did not matter to sociology. At least in Luckmann's sociology of knowledge, privatized religion and shared language complemented each other. In replacing the differentiating religious value, common language was just presupposed to be "already there." Hence, the framework of the national society found in this view on language had been almost unreflected. Additionally, the notion of shared language could be critically examined in terms of ideology as well, because it has not only the "left," but also the "right" implication.

5 Conclusion

Insofar as assuming that language has a function of collective orientation, Luckmann's linguistic sociology is not so different to Parsons's normativism. The distinction between the two lies merely in the premise about "what people share in modern society." Linguistic sociology held that a language was intersubjectively shared among individuals, whereas a religious value caused segmentation. In other words, people are born primarily into their linguistic community, not their religious community. However, this assumption will inevitably raise the following two questions: first, in what social backgrounds it is possible to assume the sharing of language, and second, whether the assumption is theoretically tenable, in particular, from an individualist standpoint.

Regarding these two questions, the most notable person in the history of sociology might be Max Weber, the pioneer of interpretative sociology. Living in the German Empire, whose border was fluid and ethnic situation complicated, he did not believe that a linguistic community is substantial and identical with the state.
With his political conviction for Western modernity, he conceptualized interpretative sociology as an individualistic and rationalistic theory. For Weber, the formation of a nation-state, ethnic community, and even linguistic community was consistently artificial, being based on subjective belief. In this sense, he intentionally avoided the linguistic turn.

The communality of language, which is created through the same kind of traditions in the family and neighboring environment, facilitates mutual understanding to the highest degree, that is, the establishment of all social relations. However, this linguistic communality itself does not yet mean community formation [Vergemeinschaftung], but it only means the facilitation of the interaction [Verkehr] inside the group in question, namely, the facilitation of the genesis of Gesellschaft formations [Vergesellschaftungen]. First among individuals, not in their nature as linguistic comrades [Sprachgenossen], but rather as other kinds of interested people, the orientation toward the rules of common language is thus primarily only a means of communicating [Verständigung] and not the semantic content of social relations. (Weber [1921] 1980: 22-23)

Even without tracing Weber's argument, we can discover his radically individualist position in this citation; the boundary of a linguistic community is only drawn with an awareness of the difference from other ones. In fact, Luckmann also refers to such a subjective and artificial course of community formation as indicated by Weber (Luckmann and Knoblauch 1993: 722). With Hubert Knoblauch, Luckmann points out the role of language in establishing ethnic or national identity:

To the same degree as communicative processes may come to symbolize a shared culture, language is the symbol system most likely to embody a whole ethnonational constellation. Therefore, within the social network considered as a communicative matrix, language itself is predestinated to become an ideological rallying point for whatever elites are involved in the social communication of nationhood. (Luckmann and Knoblauch 1993: 723)

Luckmann thought that language had the universal implication in forming collective, particularly national identities. The empirical evidence for this can be found both in the case of early modern nation-states such as France, in the case of "delayed nations" like Germany, and in the various types of smaller ethnically and linguistically "beleaguered" peoples such as those in Armenia, Lithuania, Poland,
Ireland, Latvia, and Slovenia (Luckmann and Knoblauch 1993: 723-724).

However, it may be more noteworthy that the time when Luckmann showed this indication in 1993 in his joint paper, entitled "Language and Communication in the Construction of Personal, Ethnic and National Identity," coincided with the end of the "Cold Peace" and an increase in nationalism around the world. In this work published in an academic journal of Slovenia, newly independent from Yugoslavia, Luckmann says that whereas today's German nationalism symbolizes not an autochthonous ethnic tradition but a supranational "Western" opposition to the intrusion of the Second and Third World, mixing elements of American and British youth culture, Slovenian national identity is powerfully tied to the Slovenian language (Luckmann and Knoblauch 1993: 724). In other words, language contributes to the self-awareness of the Slovenian people.

The point herein is the subjective "languageconsciousness [sic]" (Luckmann and Knoblauch 1993: 725). Considering a language as an external reality sui generis from an objectivistic viewpoint is no longer sufficient. Rather, the subjective process in which the people consider their language as a reality sui generis should be examined. Especially today, the presupposition of something shared as social a priori is scarcely maintainable in theory because globalization and individualization are radically developing in parallel. The diversification of lifestyle signifies that of the life-world, and language is no exception in this respect. In fact, as Nishikawa (2006: 101-102) suggests, linguistic differences in stratification, region, and generation are increasing even within individual national languages. Accordingly, we should rather begin from the premise that what people share is a situation in which they share nothing. By bracketing the framework of national society, we must observe what people construct as the shared and how they construct it by drawing a boundary with others. In this context, language will genuinely matter to sociological theory because, unlike at the time of the national society, language(-consciousness) gives rise to many issues such as linguistic imperialism and linguistic conflict in the present global society.

Notes

* This article is a more detailed and elaborate version of part of my presentation titled "Language as a Zombie Category of Sociological Theory" (Tada 2014), at the ISA World Congress of Sociology in Yokohama, Japan. A revised and enlarged proceedings paper will soon be published in International Histories of Sociology: Conference Proceedings of the Research Committee on History of Sociology from the XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology in Yokohama, 13-19 July 2014 (provisional title).
In fact, Luckmann wrote an article "Soziologie der Sprache [Sociology of Language]" as a lexical item in 1962. Therein he said that the sociology of language has not yet been developed as an independent discipline, and even though theoretical approaches and research articles exist, they derive minimally from sociology (Luckmann 1962: 515).

Symbolically, it was in 1967 when Richard Rorty edited and published an anthology of papers entitled Linguistic Turn. Thereafter, this slogan became widely popular.

Although I cannot examine it in this article, Alfred Schütz, who was Luckmann's teacher and the pioneering figure of phenomenological sociology, had also been consistently concerned about language since the early part of his study career in the 1920s. Luckmann initially names not Durkheim but Schütz as the sociologist under the item "sociology of language" in the State Lexicon, focusing on the distinction between sign function and symbol function in language (Luckmann 1962: 516). Regarding Schütz's own argument about language, see, for instance, Schütz (2003) as well as his course of lectures in 1952 reconstructed by Fred Kersten (Schutz 2010: 61–105) and their introduction by Kersten and Lester Embree (Schutz 2010: 54–60). Interestingly, throughout the lectures, Schütz also refers to Durkheim and de Saussure on occasion. Additionally, as Kersten and Embree point out (Schutz 2010: 54–55), Schütz elsewhere quotes Antonie Meillet, greatly influenced by Durkheim, from Karl Vossler's book. As we shall see, Luckmann's view on language is definitely Durkheimian, which is possibly through the influence of Schütz. In reference to the following discussion, as Schütze and Meindl (2004) also point out, Schütz is, along with George Herbert Mead and Durkheim, one of the representative persons who emphasized the contribution of language to the production, preservation, and change of social reality (and who determined the subsequent approach to language in theoretical and empirical studies of sociology).

In general, the terms "sociology of language" and "linguistic sociology" seem to be used nearly synonymously. But, as Tada (2013: 74) suggests, the distinction between them should be compared with the difference between "philosophy of language" and "linguistic philosophy," although in the following citations, the English translation of the two German terms Soziologie der Sprache and Sprachsociologie depends on the context.

For citation from Fishman (1971), I retranslated from the German edition the text that Fritz Sack had translated from the "American" language.

On this history, see also Spolsky ([2011] 2013: 16–17).

The congress program can be seen in Kjolseth and Sack (1971: 391–393). Aside from the presentations, 24 related articles were distributed in the sections as well.

Additionally, a precursor movement had already occurred in the United States. According to Kjolseth (1971), the sociology of language rapidly developed there. In reality, at Charles Ferguson's suggestion, the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) set up the Committee on Sociolinguistics in 1963. On this matter, see Kjolseth (1971: 26–27), Ervin-Tripp ([1997] 2010: 64–65), Spolsky ([2011] 2013: 11). The council's website even says that the establishment of that committee eventually led to the creation of the field
of sociolinguistics (SSRC 2014). Moreover, according to Fishman’s retrospect, it was he himself who undertook the duties of chairman and organizer at the aforementioned informal meeting, with these functions being transferred to him from the SSRC’s Committee on Sociolinguistics.

(9) Afterward, sociology of language [Sprachsoziologie] or sociolinguistics also developed in Federal Republic of Germany under the influence of the Anglo-Saxon approach. See Knoblauch (2003: 581–584).

(10) Roger W. Shuy speaks of the influence that the increased concern for minorities exerted on linguistics in the 1960s. “As new interest in minorities developed, the country, under President Kennedy’s leadership, began viewing its citizens in a new way. Those who are products of later societies might not realize the tremendous impact such ideas had on linguistics at that time” (Shuy [1990] 2010: 21).

(11) Macnamara (1967) suggests that a seemingly monolingual environment is limited to some areas such as America. The linguistic situation in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia is obviously different. Furthermore, many new nations, which must achieve their modernization with ethnic diversity, cannot afford to wait to develop a particular indigenous language as a common instrument. As a result, languages of wider communication such as English or French were adopted as “national languages” (properly speaking, “official languages”), thus creating more new bilinguals.

(12) There occurred a symbolic event in 2007: the ISA’s Research Committee on Sociolinguistics, established in 1968 as stated above, was renamed the “Research Committee on Language and Society.” According to Spolsky ([2011] 2013: 20 n. 8), the secretary wrote to him in a personal communication, explaining the change as follows: “We decided on a change of name because we felt that ‘Sociolinguistics’ might sound a bit limiting as far as prospective new members were concerned. We conducted an online vote on the five most popular suggested names for change from all our members. Since the name change we have captured a more diverse membership.”

(13) It is said that the word “sociolinguistics” was first used in print in Currie (1952). But, the distinction between sociolinguistics and sociology of language seems to have not been very clear, at least in the earlier stages. For instance, Joshua Fishman published a textbook entitled Sociolinguistics: A Brief Introduction in 1970, although he preferred the term “sociology of language” (Ervin-Tripp [1997] 2010: 68). In fact, his other books mostly use “sociology of language” in their titles. This preference is probably not unrelated to his criticism that sociolinguistics is weighted in favor of linguistics (cf. Romaine 2000: x).


(15) Regarding the privatization of religion (the sacred cosmos), see Luckmann ([1979] 1983: 163) and Berger et al. ([1973] 1974: 76–77). The “homelessness” of Berger refers to the increase in selectivity (the pressure for pluralization of life-worlds) combined with the secularization of religion and the consequent migratory state.

(16) According to Ken’ichi Tominaga, “national society” means “the human substructure
that underlies the nation-state. That is, it is the largest local society formed on the basis of the territory of nation-state" (Tominaga 1990: 402).

(17) In terms of combining meaning, understanding, and language, Jürgen Habermas might also be included in this school. In his view, "[a]n experience intersubjectively communized in a strict sense is unthinkable without the concept of a communicated meaning 'shared' by different subjects. Identical meanings [Identische Bedeutungen] are not formed in the intentional structure of a solitary subject standing against his world. Only in the identical validity for different subjects do meanings obtain identity in some sort of understandable meaning" (Habermas 1984: 58).

(18) This tendency is particularly prominent when Luckmann describes the evolutionary emergence of language. For example, he states as follows: "In the process of intersubjective mirroring the production of expressive forms became standardized, and the interpretation of the meaning of an expressive form by its producer, the interpretation of it by the addressee, and this interpretation (by the addressee) as anticipated by the producer became congruent for all practical purposes" (Luckmann 1984: 12-13, emphasis added). In this "glottogony" by Luckmann, the standardization of language is first assumed as a natural and historical process, while the aspect of its artificial institutionalization is scarcely mentioned.

(19) This tendency can be also found in The Social Construction of Reality. See Berger and Luckmann ([1966] 1989: 17-18). Their primary aim in this book was to synthesize Weber and Durkheim. This seems to have led to a common theoretical ground with Parsons in presupposing that something macro-social is shared among people.

(20) Needless to say, Parsons did not make the turn from religion to language. It is true that admitting his own inclination to treat the orientational aspect of culture as synonymous with religion, he advocated the existence of communication mechanisms that mediate the sharing of a cultural system, because the cultural system is indeed shared among a plurality of individuals. Parsons regarded language here as the fundamental evolutionary universal. However, he states that both religion and linguistic communication are the "evolutionary universals" necessary for human society. Therefore, he did not replace language with religion. (Incidentally, Parsons notes that in addition to religion and linguistic communication, social organization and technology are the four "evolutionary universals"). See Parsons (1964: 341).

(21) The same view on language is also shown in The Social Construction of Reality. According to the authors, "[n]ormally, of course, the decisive sign system is linguistic. Language objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available to all within the linguistic community, thus becoming both the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of knowledge" (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1989: 68), and therefore "all who employ this same language are [the same social] reality-maintaining others" (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1989: 154). Berger and Luckmann think that even the non-everyday "leaps" in religious experiences can be "translated" into the reality of everyday life.
because "common language" is used for the objectification of such experiences (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1989: 25–26).

(2) This English translation is the one by Luckmann from the 1953 edition. The original German text is as follows: "Denn so innerlich auch die Sprache durchaus ist, so hat sie dennoch zugleich ein unabhängiges, äußeres, gegen den Menschen selbst / Gewalt ausübendes Dasein." Note that von Humboldt's article is also referred to in Schutz (2010: 86).

(2) In this context, Luckmann also refers to a book entitled Language, Thought and Reality, being the selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, who is famous along with Edward Sapir for the linguistic relativism hypothesis. See Luckmann (1967: 55 n. 24–122). However, Luckmann does not enter the debate on the validity of the linguistic "determinism" hypothesis. To begin with, he in no way clarifies whether or not he agrees with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, although his view on language is obviously close to this hypothesis. In this regard, his statement on the relationship between language and recognition sounds inarticulate. See also Luckmann (1969: 1058–1059) and Luckmann (1972b: XV–XVI).

(2) See Luckmann ([1973] 1983b: 88–89) and Luckmann and Knoblauch (1993: 720). In his opinion, language is the principal medium not only for the social construction of reality, but also for the social transmission and subjective internalization of such constructed realities. Hence, he indicates that the most important social function of language, besides the communicative one, is its role in stabilizing the subjective system of pragmatic and moral orientation. He also notes as follows: "Languages are the core of social stocks of knowledge. They are not only ways of looking at reality but also ways of dealing with reality and thus, even if indirectly, ways of making reality" (Luckmann 1984: 14, emphasis added).

(25) In The Structures of the Life-World by Schütz and Luckmann is also written as follows: "[F]rom the very start, my life world is not my private world but intersubjective" (Schütz und Luckmann 1975: 24). Here we do not cover this book, but its socialphenomenological view on language is explicit. For instance, see Schütz und Luckmann (1975: 232–234, 248–252).

(26) Peter Berger has a similar tendency. In The Sacred Canopy, he asserted that the understanding of language as paradigmatic for the objectivity (the reality sui generis) of social phenomena is derived from Durkheim, although the book that he refers to is Antoine Meillet's Linguistique historique et linguistique générale (Berger [1967] 1990: 12–13 n. 16, 189). Meillet is well known for dealing with language in Durkheimian terms. Incidentally, Talcott Parsons compliments The Sacred Canopy, pointing out that Berger analyzed religious symbol systems from a Durkheimian perspective. It is true that Parsons criticizes Berger's Neo-Marxian direction whereby the secular world centered on economic interest and market structure underlies the world of the sacred. Nonetheless, Parsons appreciates Berger as one of those who approached most closely to developing the lines initiated by Durkheim. See Parsons (1978a: 229).
In a related move, among classical sociologists, Durkheim seems to be the person who most mentioned education. However, as Takehiko Kariya (2014: 107-108) points out, education, for Durkheim, was exclusively discussed in connection with social integration and was never dealt with from the perspective of inequality and educational opportunity within society. Presumably, Durkheim’s discussion on education gave weight to the theory of (French) nation-building, and therefore the diversity within society was out of his sight.

See also Luckmann (1983b: 1569). Here he peculiarly pays attention to Meillet.

See also Luckmann (1972a). Additionally, Luckmann ([1973] 1983a) proposes the program of a universal science (mathēsis universalis) for social reality with reference to Edmund Husserl, and criticizes, for instance, symbolic interactionists, ethnomethodologists, and anthropologists for not presupposing a matrix of universal and invariant structures in everyday life despite these scholars focusing on the ordinary language (Luckmann [1973] 1983a: 28). Though not explicitly, he seems to include them in what he calls the “ethnocentric ‘picture-book phenomenology’ of the 1920s and...the 1960s” (Luckmann [1973] 1983a: 30).

Luckmann does not always ignore the social problems of language. For instance, Luckmann ([1973] 1983b: 90–91) refers to the issues of linguistic struggle based on differences in institutions, groups, and classes. But, these are only briefly mentioned at the end of a theoretical consideration of language. As his concern about language is primarily directed at theoretically explaining the dialectic relationship between language and society (or the language-mediated relationship between the individual and society), the “practical considerations” (Luckmann 1971: 40; Luckmann 1973: 55) about, for example, the problems of linguistic conflict and educational inequality, seem to be relatively secondary.

For similar opinions, see Luckmann (1981: 60), Luckmann (1983b: 1572–1574) and Luckmann and Knoblauch (1993: 719–720). From the ontogenetical standpoint, Luckmann thought that language came into being in the intersubjective overcoming of prelinguistic problems (Luckmann 1983b: 1572). In his view, individual experience and knowledge are removed from its concreteness and individuality through language, and thus become objective meaning. "In this way, linguistically objectivized ‘problem solutions’ will be placed in a meaning connection [Bedeutungszusammenhang] that is ripped from the subjective meaning in its historicity and anonymity much stronger than any individual scheme of experience” (Luckmann 1983b: 1573).

Hobsbawm states that "the Western cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s produced a strong neo-romantic and irrationalist attack on the scientific view of the world, which could readily shift from a radical to reactionary key” (Hobsbawm [1994] 1996: 555).

As Karl Deutsch states, a people (or nation) is a “community of shared meanings” (Deutsch 1969: 14).

Actually, the first linguistic nationalism in modernity seems not the German one that depends on ethnic and vernacular elements, but the French one whose elements are civic and territorial with the civilizing mission (cf. Smith 1991: 13). Based on the strong
universalism, the French language got rid of other indigenous languages. As Smith (1991: 13) says, there was almost no dispute about the need to inculcate national ideals, national history, and national language through a mass, public education system. Regardless of ideological stance, the individuality of France and the French as such was never questioned.

(35) About this world tendency in particular, see also Hobsbawm ([1994] 1996: 295–301).

(36) Concerning schools as the most important agency to legitimize new experts in modern society, see also Berger et al. ([1973] 1974: 132).

(37) Limited here as a suggestion, the "turn from religion to language" has since the 18th century been a trend of modernity as a whole coupled with print capitalism. Whereas religious communities were in decline, nationalism emerged as particularly dependent on language (not blood!). See Anderson (1991). Consequently, patriotism had become—if keeping the term religion—a "civic religion" in the 19th century (Hobsbawm 1992: 85). The incidental point to be made here is that nations are not only constructed from above, but also from below (Hobsbawm 1992: 10–11). Nation-building from below is not necessarily national and still less nationalist. It is associated with the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings, and interests of ordinary people.

(38) Luckmann does not always ignore the historical variability and regional and social-stratification differentiation among societies or inside a society. For instance, see Luckmann (1981: 62) and Luckmann (1993: 374–378). He acknowledges that the society in which the social stock of knowledge is wholly homogeneously distributed is only conceivable in a thought experiment (Luckmann 1993: 374). However, the premise of the life-worldly given language and the idea of linguistic community seem to be still maintained. In the first place, it remains obscure how phenomenological sociology deals with linguistic discontinuities and discrepancies.

(39) I discuss this point in greater detail in Tada (2014).

(40) Prior to this date at least, as far as may be judged from the title, Luckmann apparently has no work dealing with the relationship between language and national identity. Nevertheless, he had previously discussed the contribution of language as the social a priori to personal identity. See Luckmann (1981). This is because he originally thinks that the construction of personal identity is intersubjective (Luckmann 1981: 57). Related to this point, see a Slovenian article entitled "Jezik in osebna identiteta [Language and Personal Identity]" (Luckmann 1991) along with Luckmann (1983).

(41) Incidentally, Luckmann was born in 1927 in Jesenice, the current Republic of Slovenia, which was a part of the then Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (in 1929 the name was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), and he grew up in a bilingual environment of Slovenian and German through his family and schools. See Schnettler (2006: 15–17).

(42) Regarding national history, there are already many outstanding empirical studies. Among them, Okamoto (2013) provides a highly convincing analysis on the relationship between history textbooks and "national society" in postwar Japan.
References


———, 1991, "Jezik in osebna identiteta [Language and Personal Identity]," translated by


Okamoto, Tomochika, 2013, *Kyôsei shakai to nashonaru hisutori: Rekishi kyôkasho no shiten kara* [Coexistence Society and National History: From the Perspective of History Textbook], Tokyo: Keisôshobô.


Sekine, Masami, 1994, Esunishiti no seiji shakaitse: Minzoku funsō no seidokan no tame ni [Political Sociology of Ethnicity: Institutionalization of Ethnic Conflict], Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai [The University of Nagoya Press]. (In Japanese.)


CONTENTS

Special Issue : Examining Relationships between People in Need of Care and People Responsible for Care in the Age of Neo-Liberalism

Introduction: Examining Relationships between People in Need of Care and People Responsible for Care in the Age of Neo-Liberalism ..................................................... Yasuko MUGIKURA 1

The Current of Assistance and Individual Initiative for Persons with Disabilities: Politics of "Independence" and "Autonomy" .......................................................... Kosuke OKABE 3

Dealing with Incompatibility: Considering Assistance for Disabled ............................................ Yuriko IINO 19

Sociology of "Toyisha-shugi (individual autonomism)" : Diagnosing the Society in Question .......................... Josuke AMADA 35

Arguments over Personalisation: Conflict between Criticisms on Neo-liberalism and the Disabled People's Movement in the UK ........................................... Yasuko MUGIKURA 47

Articles

Collective Aspects of Contemporary Religious Phenomena .......................................................... Mikiko NAGAI and Mamoru YAMADA 61

Religious Narratives on the WWW: Construction of the Database of Religious Discourse and Quantitative Data Analysis through Its Use ........................................ Masahiro KONO 77

The Final Policy of the Coalmining Industry and Miners' Re-employment: A Microdata Analysis of Mitsui Ashibetsu Coalmine in Hokkaido, Japan ........................................ Naoko SHIMAZAKI 93

A Study on "Relation Conditioning Work" : How It Visualizes the Vicious Cycle of Human Relations ........................................ Kentaro YABE 111

From Religion to Language: The Time of National Society and the Notion of the "Shared" in Sociological Theory .................. Mitsuhiro TADA 123